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The Quasi-Revival of the Canadian 
Bill of Rights and Its Implications for 
Administrative Law 
Lorne Sossin* 
Curiously, one of the most significant features of the administrative 
law cases decided by the Supreme Court this past term was the promi-
nence of the Canadian Bill of Rights.1 Authorson (Litigation Guardian 
of) v. Canada (Attorney General)2 raised the scope of procedural protec-
tion in sections 1(a) and 2(b) of the Bill of Rights, while Bell Canada v. 
C.T.E.A.3 the content of section 2(b). The Court has also granted leave 
in a third Bill of Rights case, Air Canada v. Canada (Attorney General).4 
In this brief review, I offer an account of what appears to be something 
of a Bill of Rights revival in the federal administrative law sphere, and 
the implications of the Bill of Rights for the development of Canadian 
administrative law more generally. Notwithstanding the enduringly 
conservative approach of the Supreme Court to developing its Bill of 
Rights jurisprudence, I suggest the role of the Bill of Rights (and other 
quasi-constitutional instruments) may grow in light of other develop-
ments in Canadian administrative law. 
The Bill of Rights often has been described as “a half-way house be-
tween a purely common law regime and a constitutional one” or simply, 
                                                                                                                                
*  Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto. I am grateful to David 
Mullan for his constructive comments on an earlier draft and to the helpful comments of those 
who attended the presentation of this paper at the Constitutional Cases conference on April 2, 
2004. 
1  S.C. 1960, c. 44, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. III. For additional commentary on 
the significant administrative decisions during this term, see L. Sossin, “Developments in 
Administrative Law: The 2002-2003 Term” (2003) 22 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 21-82. 
2  [2003] 2 S.C.R. 40, [2003] S.C.J. No. 40. 
3  [2003] 1 S.C.R. 884, [2003] S.C.J. No. 36. 
4  (2003), 23 C.P.R. (4th) 129, [2003] J.Q. no. 21 (C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. 
granted (2003), 26 C.P.R. (4th) vi (S.C.C.). 
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for short, a “quasi-constitutional” instrument.5 The significance of this 
characterization for administrative law was highlighted in the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Ocean Port Hotel Ltd. v. British Columbia (General 
Manager, Liquor Control & Licensing Branch),6 in which the Court 
observed that the common law rules of procedural fairness could be 
displaced by an expressly worded statute, except in jurisdictions where 
quasi-constitutional guarantees of procedural fairness had been enacted. 
The significance of Ocean Port for the Bill of Rights is addressed further 
below.  
Where statutory provisions appear to displace common law proce-
dural guarantees, the Bill of Rights may well be the only recourse af-
fected parties have to challenge federal government action.7 Even where 
other protections are available (for example, the Charter), the Bill of 
Rights may nonetheless provide a preferable route to a remedy in light 
of the distinctive features of the due process and fair hearing provisions 
(for example, the due process protection over the enjoyment of prop-
erty)8 and the absence of a limiting clause such as section 1 of the Char-
ter. For all of these reasons, the Bill of Rights merits renewed attention 
from constitutional and administrative law observers alike. 
This paper is divided into three sections. In the first section, I trace 
the background of the Bill of Rights and its impact on federal adminis-
trative law. In the second section, I examine Authorson and Bell Canada, 
                                                                                                                                
5  See, for example, R. v. Hogan, [1975] 2 S.C.R. 574, at 597. 
6  [2001] 2 S.C.R. 781, [2001] S.C.J. No. 17. In that case, the quasi-constitutional 
guarantee referred to was s. 23 of the Quebec Charter of human rights and freedoms, R.S.Q. 
c. C-12. In Air Canada, as discussed below, the Quebec Court of Appeal observed that other 
quasi-constitutional instruments such as the Bill of Rights would be treated similarly. (See 
supra, note 4, at para. 56). 
7  While the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms [Part I of the Constitution Act, 
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11], also provides proce-
dural guarantees under s. 7, the threshold of having to demonstrate that a right to life, liberty 
or the security of the person has been deprived, limits its application in administrative law 
settings. For discussion of the Charter’s application to administrative settings, see Blencoe v. 
British Columbia (Human Rights Commission), [2000] 2 S.C.R. 307, [2000] S.C.J. No. 43. 
See also Singh v. Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration), [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177, 
[1985] S.C.J. No. 11, discussed below. 
8  See R. v. Bryan (1999), 170 D.L.R. (4th) 487, at 497-98, [1999] M.J. No. 49 (C.A.). 
See generally P. Hogg, “A Comparison of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms with 
the Canadian Bill of Rights” in Beaudoin & Ratushny (eds.), The Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms (2d ed. 1989), at 7. 
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and the questions resolved and raised by the Supreme Court’s recent 
treatment of the Bill of Rights in this context. In the third and final sec-
tion, I consider the future of the Bill of Rights for administrative law and 
the issues to be raised in the forthcoming Air Canada appeal. 
I.  A SHORT, AMBIVALENT HISTORY OF THE CANADIAN BILL OF 
RIGHTS AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
Those who welcomed the Bill of Rights in the pre-Charter era rarely 
did so on the basis of its promise of procedural protections. David Mul-
lan recently observed bluntly that, “[t]he Canadian Bill of Rights has 
never figured prominently in federal Administrative Law.”9 Mullan 
accounts for this by recourse to a variety of factors, including the “par-
simonious” judicial interpretation of the Bill of Rights in the period from 
its enactment to the entrenchment of the Charter of Rights and Free-
doms and the preference for the Charter after that period. As I elaborate 
below, the other factor which may account for the Bill of Rights’ check-
ered past is the lack of clarity regarding the where and how the proce-
dural protections contained in the Bill of Rights differed from those 
contained in the common law duty of fairness and those protected by the 
Charter, respectively. 
The relevant parts of the Canadian Bill of Rights provide: 
1.  It is hereby recognized and declared that in Canada there have 
existed and shall continue to exist without discrimination by 
reason of race, national origin, colour, religion or sex, the 
following human rights and fundamental freedoms, namely, 
(a)  the right of the individual to life, liberty, security of the 
person and enjoyment of property, and the right not to be 
deprived thereof except by due process of law... 
2.  Every law of Canada shall, unless it is expressly declared by an 
Act of the Parliament of Canada that it shall operate 
notwithstanding the Canadian Bill of Rights, be so construed and 
applied as not to abrogate, abridge, or infringe or to authorize the 
                                                                                                                                
9  D. Mullan, “Constitutional Guarantees, Quasi-Constitutional Guarantees and Ad-
ministrative Tribunals: A Thaw in the Ice?” (Paper prepared for The Constitution in Your 
Administrative Law Practice, OBA Conference, Tuesday, March 2, 2004), at 3 [unpublished]. 
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abrogation, abridgment or infringement of any of the rights or 
freedoms herein recognized and declared, and in particular, no 
law of Canada shall be construed or applied so as to 
. . .  
(e)  deprive a person of the right to a fair hearing in accordance 
with the principles of fundamental justice for the 
determination of his rights and obligations... 
Prior to the enactment of the Charter, the Bill of Rights had little 
impact on administrative law in Canada, notwithstanding the guarantee 
of “due process” in section 1(a) and a “fair hearing” in section 2(e) of 
the Bill of Rights. 
The “due process” protection in section 1(a) of the Bill of Rights is 
often associated with the American constitutional tradition, where it has 
predominated the debate on procedural fairness. The term, of course, 
has a much richer and deeper tradition, appearing shortly after the 
Magna Carta and typically associated with checks on executive power 
— for example, the statute abolishing the Star Chamber in 1640 cited 
the fact that its actions had not been in accordance with “due process of 
law.”10 However, for Canadian jurists, it is the long and controversial 
history of “due process” in American constitutional law that has proven 
the most vexing.11 Wary of being seen as second guessing the wisdom 
of legislation without any constitutional mandate to do so, the “due 
process” protection under section 1(a) of the Bill of Rights was held not 
to be infringed where government acted in accordance with statutory 
guidelines, even if those guidelines themselves failed to provide even 
minimal procedural protections.12 
                                                                                                                                
10  Act of Parliament, 1640 (U.K.), 16 Chas. I, c. 10. For a discussion of “due process,” 
see W. Tarnopolsky, The Canadian Bill of Rights, 2d ed. (Toronto: Methuen, 1976), at 221-
35. 
11  In what is often referred to as the Lochner era (named after Lochner v. New York, 
198 U.S. 45 (1905)), the “due process” clause of the Fourth and Fifteenth Amendments to the 
U.S. Constitution was invoked to invalidate early welfare state legislation on the rationale of 
protecting “economic rights.” The notion of substantive due process has often served as a 
touchstone for judicial intervention in public policy ever since. For its influence on Canadian 
thinking in the early Bill of Rights era, see I.C. Rand, “Except by Due Process of Law” (1961) 
1 Osgoode Hall L.J. 171.  
12  For a survey of this early Bill of Rights case law, see Tarnopolsky, supra, note 10, at 
234. In P.S.A.C. v. Canada (Treasury Board), [1984] 2 F.C. 562 (T.D.), aff’d [1984] 2 F.C. 
889 (C.A.), Reed J. stated (at 603 [T.D.]), “‘without due process of law’ in the Canadian Bill 
 
(2004), 25 S.C.L.R. (2d) Quasi-Revival of Cdn. Bill of Rights 195 
 
The best known statement on substantive due process under section 
1(a) of the Bill of Rights appears in R. v. Curr,13 which involved a chal-
lenge to a provision of the Criminal Code14 making it an offence not to 
provide a breath sample without reasonable excuse. In his analysis of 
this provision, Laskin C.J., speaking on behalf of himself, Abbott, Mart-
land, Judson, Hall, Spence, and Pigeon JJ., left the door only slightly 
ajar for review of legislation for substantive due process: 
... I am like wise of the opinion that s. 1(a) of the Canadian Bill of 
Rights does not make it inoperative. Assuming that “except by due 
process of law” provides a means of controlling substantive federal 
legislation — a point that did not directly arise in Regina. v. Drybones 
— compelling reasons ought to be advanced to justify the court in this 
case to employ a statutory (as contrasted with a constitutional) 
jurisdiction to deny operative effect to a substantive measure duly 
enacted by a Parliament constitutionally competent to do so, and 
exercising its powers in accordance with the tenets of responsible 
government, which underlie the discharge of legislative authority 
under the British North America Act. Those reasons must relate to 
objective and manageable standards by which a Court should be 
guided if scope is to be found in s. 1(a) due process to silence 
otherwise competent federal legislation. Neither reasons nor 
underlying standards were offered here. For myself, I am not prepared 
in this case to surmise what they might be.15 
Procedural due process is also clearly contemplated by section 1(a), 
but as Laskin J. observed in Curr, it is difficult to see what procedural 
content may be read into section 1(a) beyond what is already contem-
plated under section 2(e).16 The “fair hearing” guarantee under section 
                                                                                                                                
of Rights has not been interpreted as including substantive due process. Even if the Supreme 
Court left the door open a crack, towards this expanded interpretation in R. v. Curr, [1972] 
S.C.R. 889, at pages 899-900, as plaintiff argues, jurisprudence since that time has not opened 
that door. Indeed, Laskin C.J. in giving the majority decision of the Court in the Curr case at 
page 902, warned against entering the “ ‘bog [of] legislative policy making’ which is involved 
in considerations of economic due process.” 
13  [1972] S.C.R. 889. 
14  S.C. 1953-54, c. 51 [now R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46]. 
15  Curr, supra, note 13, at 899-900. 
16  Id., at 898. Nonetheless, s. 1(a) has been viewed as primarily a procedural protection 
in its more recent interpretations: see Smith, Kline & French Laboratories Ltd. v. Canada 
(Attorney General), [1986] 1 F.C. 274, at 302-304, aff’d [1987] 2 F.C. 359, [1986] F.C.J. No. 
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2(e) of the Bill of Rights is limited to settings where a person’s “rights or 
obligations” may be adversely affected. Mullan earlier described this 
protection as “generally unfertile ground” for procedural claims in the 
period of Bill of Rights jurisprudence prior to the enactment of the Char-
ter.17  
After the enactment of the Charter, the Bill of Rights seemed to be 
granted a new lease on life by the Supreme Court in Singh v. Canada.18 
In that decision, three justices of a six-justice majority relied on section 
2(e) of the Bill of Rights in ruling inoperative a statutory scheme which 
failed to provide refugee claimants with an oral hearing (the other three 
justices in the majority relied on section 7 of the Charter). Among other 
findings, Beetz J., writing for the three justices who applied the Bill of 
Rights, concluded that the procedural protections contained in section 
2(e) of the Bill of Rights are not ancillary to the “due process” contained 
in section 1 — in other words, it is not necessary to demonstrate the 
violation of a “fundamental right” in order to invoke the right to a fair 
hearing; rather, the infringement of any right or obligation is sufficient 
to trigger the free-standing procedural protections of section 2(e). While 
Singh may have resolved the question of a link between these two pro-
cedural protections, that decision only accentuated the question as to the 
different scope and content each of these procedural guarantees might 
contain. 
Subsequently, in MacBain v. Canada (Human Rights Commis-
sion),19 the Federal Court of Appeal explored the reach of section 2(e) in 
more depth, and used the “fair hearing” protection to rule inoperative 
provisions of the Canadian Human Rights Act20 which permitted the 
Chair of the Canadian Human Rights Commission to select Tribunal 
members to hear a complaint which the Commission was also charged 
with investigating and prosecuting. While the Supreme Court has not 
                                                                                                                                
787 (C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused (1987), 27 C.R.R. 286n (S.C.C.). See also 
Energy Probe v. Canada (Attorney General) (1994), 17 O.R. (3d) 717, at 759, [1994] O.J. 
No. 553 (Gen. Div.). 
17  D. Mullan, Administrative Law (Toronto: Carswell, 1996) at §88, citing Prata v. 
Canada (Minister of Manpower & Immigration), [1976] 1 S.C.R. 376; Howarth v. Canada 
(National Parole Board), [1976] 1 S.C.R. 453; and R. v. Mitchell (sub nom. Mitchell v. R.), 
[1976] 2 S.C.R. 570. 
18  Supra, note 7. 
19  [1985] 1 F.C. 856 , [1985] F.C.J. No. 907 (C.A.). 
20  S.C. 1976-77, c. 33 [now R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6]. 
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expressly endorsed MacBain, it has been relied upon in other cases in 
the context of institutional independence and impartiality.21 
After MacBain, this judicial revival of the procedural protection 
contained in section 2(e) of the Bill of Rights appeared to stall. Where 
both the Bill of Rights and the Charter applied, litigants and courts ap-
peared to prefer the Charter route, or simply to proceed under the com-
mon law procedural guarantees where applicable.22 It remained an open 
question how the Court would apply protections contained in the Bill of 
Rights, such as the “due process” guarantee, that were not duplicated in 
the Charter.  
One of the sparks that ignited renewed interest in the Bill of Rights 
among administrative law observers was the Supreme Court’s reference 
to quasi-constitutional instruments in Ocean Port. In Ocean Port, the 
Supreme Court distinguished between common law independence pro-
tections, which could be displaced by an expressly worded statute on the 
one hand, and Charter and quasi-constitutional independence protections 
on the other hand, which could not.23 Specifically, McLachlin C.J., 
writing for the Court, pointed out that the Court’s willingness to subject 
a statutory scheme of liquor regulation to scrutiny on independence 
grounds in 2747-3174 Québec Inc. v. Québec (Régie des permis 
d’alcool),24 was based on the fact the challenge in that case was brought 
pursuant to section 23 of the Quebec Charter of human rights and free-
doms, which guaranteed the right to “a full and equal, public and fair 
hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal.” The Court in Ocean 
Port characterized the Quebec Charter as a “quasi-constitutional” stat-
ute.25 
While the Bill of Rights is not mentioned in Ocean Port, the reaf-
firmation that courts will only entertain challenges to statutes that deprive 
                                                                                                                                
21  Syndicat des employés de production du Québec & de l’Acadie v. Canada (Human 
Rights Commission), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 879, at paras. 52, 67, 70-71, [1989] S.C.J. No. 103. 
22  Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, 
[1999] S.C.J. No. 39. The Charter aspects of this challenge to a denial of a statutory exemp-
tion under the Immigration Act [R.S.C. 1985, c. I-2; now Immigration and Refugee Protection 
Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27] on humanitarian and compassionate grounds were argued extensively 
but not referred to by the Supreme Court, which found in favour of the applicant on 
administrative law grounds. 
23  Supra, note 6, at para. 24.  
24  [1996] 3 S.C.R. 919, [1996] S.C.J. No. 112. 
25  Supra, note 6, at para. 28. 
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parties of procedural rights where the Charter or a quasi-constitutional 
statute applies may breathe new life into Bill of Rights litigation. The 
Bill of Rights threshold of “rights and obligations” for invoking the “fair 
hearing” protection under section 2(e) is far broader than the Charter 
threshold of deprivations of life, liberty, and security of the person — 
thus, there will be many cases where a litigant’s only recourse to chal-
lenge a statutory scheme is the Bill of Rights. Below, I consider two 
examples from this past year in which litigants raised Bill of Rights 
challenges in precisely these circumstances. That neither litigant was 
successful in the Supreme Court under the Bill of Rights serves as a 
cautionary tale about the continuing reticence of the Supreme Court in 
the face of the Bill of Rights. However, that both litigants were success-
ful in the lower courts on this issue suggests some judicial willingness to 
approach the Bill of Rights in a novel and expansive fashion. Judicial 
ambivalence toward the Bill of Rights continues to provide hope to 
many and certainly to few. 
II.  FAIRNESS UNDER THE BILL OF RIGHTS: AUTHORSON V.  
CANADA AND BELL CANADA V. C.T.E.A. 
As indicated above, the unresolved questions swirling around the 
Bill of Rights surfaced in two cases before the Supreme Court in 2003. 
While neither of the litigants seeking to raise the Bill of Rights to chal-
lenge federal laws discussed below was successful, there is, I would 
suggest, nonetheless a basis to believe that a Bill of Rights revival may 
yet be around the corner. 
1. Authorson v. Canada 
Authorson v. Canada involves a sprawling class action against the 
federal Crown for failing to pay interest on pension funds for disabled 
veterans being administered by the federal government. By the time the 
case reached the Supreme Court, however, the only disputed issue be-
fore the Court was the scope and application of the Bill of Rights. 
Authorson presented the Court with a stark case of an admitted injustice 
involving the breach of a fiduciary obligation to a vulnerable group. 
Faced with explicit legislation barring any claims against the Crown in 
relation to that injustice, however, the Court concluded that it had no 
choice but to defer to the supremacy of Parliament. Authorson also 
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raised the issue of whether “due process” under section 1(a) of the Bill 
of Rights contains a substantive dimension, akin to substantive funda-
mental justice under section 7 of the Charter. In other words, are some 
types of statutory provisions inconsistent with section 1(a) per se, irre-
spective of what procedural guarantees are offered to an affected party? 
This is a question which the Supreme Court had avoided in earlier Bill 
of Rights jurisprudence.26 In order to understand the Court’s approach to 
the Bill of Rights in Authorson, it is important to understand something 
of the legally complex and politically sensitive nature of the litigation. 
Until January 1, 1990, the administered accounts of disabled veter-
ans were not held in interest-bearing accounts. From January 1, 1990 
onwards, the Minister of Finance directed that interest was to be paid on 
these accounts. In 1990, the Department of Veterans Affairs Act was 
amended to include an express bar to civil claims for unpaid interest on 
administered veterans’ accounts.27 
Joseph Authorson, the representative plaintiff for the class, suffered 
from a mental disability exacerbated during his service in the Canadian 
army during the Second World War. In 1950, he was awarded a full 
pension, which was ordered to be administered by the Crown. He spent 
the next forty years in a veterans’ hospital until 1991 when he was de-
clared competent to manage his own financial affairs. During the four 
decades his pension was administered by the Crown, no interest was 
paid or permitted to accrue on his account. This class action was 
brought by Authorson on behalf of all the disabled veterans whose ac-
counts were administered by the Department of Veterans Affairs. The 
class was certified on October 26, 1999. While the total amount of ex-
posure of the Crown remained a point of some contention, it was esti-
mated to be in excess of $1 billion. 
On October 11, 2000, Brockenshire J. of the Superior Court of On-
tario granted a motion for summary judgment brought by Mr. Authorson, 
and dismissed the summary judgment motion brought by the Attorney 
                                                                                                                                
26  See, for example, R. v. Morgentaler (No. 5), [1976] 1 S.C.R. 616, at 633, per Laskin J. 
27  This provision became s. 5.1(4) of the Department of Veterans Affairs Act, R.S.C. 
1985, c. V-1 [added 1990, c. 42, s. 2]. It read: “No claim shall be made after this subsection 
comes into force for or on account of interest on moneys held or administered by the Minister 
during any period prior to January 1, 1990 pursuant to subsection 41(1) of the Pension Act, 
subsection 15(2) of the War Veterans Allowance Act or any regulations made under section 5 
of this Act.” 
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General for Canada.28 Justice Brockenshire found that the Crown owed 
a fiduciary duty to the disabled veterans, and that the Crown had 
breached this duty by its failure to pay interest on administered ac-
counts. Justice Brockenshire further found that the statutory bar to civil 
recovery enacted in 1990 was inoperative due to the combined effect of 
sections 1(a) and 2(e) of the Canadian Bill of Rights.  
The Ontario Court of Appeal unanimously upheld the main aspects 
of the trial decision.29 The Court of Appeal’s ruling in Authorson con-
firmed the existence of a fiduciary obligation owed to the disabled vet-
erans whose pension accounts were being administered by the Crown. 
The Court of Appeal echoed the trial judge’s conclusion that “due proc-
ess” cannot mean “no process.”30 The Court of Appeal emphasized that 
the affected veterans were not notified that their property rights were 
going to be foreclosed by this statutory amendment or given any oppor-
tunity to contest that foreclosure. The Court of Appeal relied on 
MacBain and Singh for its interpretation of procedural protections af-
forded under the Bill of Rights.31 Not only did the Court of Appeal’s 
interpretation of the Bill of Rights appear to contradict Supreme Court 
decisions under the Charter that confirmed that the legislative process 
was not subject to procedural rights,32 but earlier jurisprudence under 
section 2(e) of the Bill of Rights and under section 7 of the Charter, has 
also consistently held that neither of these guarantees contains a right to 
an action before a civil court to recover damages, which is what the 
plaintiffs in Authorson sought.33 
While the litigation before the Ontario Superior Court and Ontario 
Court of Appeal had focused on whether the Crown owed a fiduciary 
obligation to the veterans, analogous to the obligation recognized in 
                                                                                                                                
28  (2001), 53 O.R. (3d) 221, [2000] O.J. No. 3768 (S.C.J.). 
29  (2002), 58 O.R. (3d) 417, [2002] O.J. No. 962 (C.A.). 
30  Id., at 451. 
31  Id., at 452. 
32  Native Women’s Assn. of Canada v. R. (sub nom. Native Women’s Assn. of Canada 
v. Canada), [1994] 3 S.C.R. 627, [1994] S.C.J. No. 93. 
33  See Energy Probe v. Canada (Attorney General), supra, note 16, at 731-60; Filip v. 
Waterloo (City) (1992), 98 D.L.R. (4th) 534, [1992] O.J. No. 2470 (C.A.); Hernandez v. 
Palmer (1992), 46 M.V.R. (2d) 26, [1992] O.J. No. 2648 (Gen. Div.). 
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Guerin v. Canada34 (with both the Superior Court and Court of Appeal 
finding that such a fiduciary relationship existed between the Crown and 
the disabled veterans), the Crown took the position in its appeal to the 
Supreme Court that it would concede the existence of a fiduciary obliga-
tion. The Crown contended that no recovery for breach of that obliga-
tion was available, however, because of the express statutory bar. The 
only issue in the appeal, therefore, was whether the Bill of Rights, be-
cause it contains a protection for the “enjoyment of property” and the 
right to a “fair hearing,” rendered the statutory bar inoperative.  
The Supreme Court allowed the Crown’s appeal and denied a basis 
of recovery to the veterans. While clearly sympathetic to the veterans, 
the Court rejected the Ontario Court of Appeal’s approach to the Bill of 
Rights and its finding that the “due process” protection imposed proce-
dural obligations on Parliament. Justice Major, writing for the Court, 
explained, “[d]ue process does not require that the veterans receive 
notice and a hearing before Parliament prior to the passage of expropri-
ative legislation. As unfortunate as it is for the respondent, long-
standing parliamentary tradition has never required that procedure,”35 
and later added, “[l]ong-standing parliamentary tradition makes it clear 
that the only procedure due any citizen of Canada is that proposed 
legislation receive three readings in the Senate and House of Commons 
and that it receive Royal Assent. Once that process is completed, 
legislation within Parliament’s competence is unassailable.”36 
Justice Major also discussed the scope of the property protection 
under section 1(a) of the Bill of Rights which, while not affecting the 
legislative process, would entitle affected persons to “notice and some 
opportunity to contest” a governmental expropriation of property rights 
through “adjudication of that person’s rights and obligations before a 
court or tribunal.”37 How this “due process” right differs in the view of 
                                                                                                                                
34  [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335. For additional discussion of the fiduciary aspect of Authorson, 
see L. Sossin, “Public Fiduciary Obligations, Political Trusts and the Evolving Duty of 
Reasonableness in Administrative Law” (2003) 66 Sask. L. Rev. 129-82. 
35  Authorson, supra, note 2, at para. 12. 
36  Id., at para. 37. 
37  Id., at para. 42. Justice Major  is warier of extending “substantive due process” pro-
tections through the Bill of Rights in light of the American experience with property rights of 
a substantive nature in Lochner, discussed above, in note 11. While not foreclosing the 
development of substantive property rights under the Bill of Rights, just as Laskin C.J. had 
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Major J. from the protection under section 2(e) of the Bill of Rights 
guaranteeing “fundamental justice” before a tribunal determining an 
affected party’s rights and obligations is unclear. What is clear to him is 
that neither of these provisions impedes Parliament’s right to enact 
legislation expropriating or otherwise affecting property. 
The most puzzling aspect of Major J.’s approach to the Bill of 
Rights is his assertion that it “protects only rights that existed in 1960, 
prior to passage of the Bill of Rights.”38 He concludes that, since a right 
against state expropriation did not exist prior to 1960, the Bill of Rights 
could not be interpreted to protect such a right. As Mullan observes, 
[n]ot only does this hearken back to the jurisprudence which saw 
section 1 of the Bill of Rights as merely declaratory of existing rights 
but it also reflects a position that would make any advocate of original 
intention theory of constitutional interpretation proud.39 
Mullan goes on to observe that even if this narrow approach to the sub-
stantive protections of the Bill of Rights is appropriate (and he specu-
lates that this assertion is motivated by the Court’s desire to limit the 
reach of the Bill of Rights in substantive rights), it would be an odd and 
ultimately untenable basis by which to understand the procedural guar-
antees contained in the Bill of Rights. The duty of procedural fairness 
was embryonic in the period prior to 1960. To suggest that the interpre-
tation of “fair hearing” or “due process” should be frozen in time at that 
moment, and therefore that the common law protections afforded af-
fected parties far outstrip the protections available under the Bill of 
Rights, seems to me to be both wrong in principle and an implausible 
interpretation of a quasi-constitutional instrument. It is also fundamen-
tally at odds with the Court’s approach to the procedural protections 
afforded by the Bill of Rights in Singh in which refugee claimants, who 
                                                                                                                                
not foreclosed their development in Curr, supra, note 13, Major J. concluded that it was 
unnecessary to explore their scope in this case. 
38  Authorson, id. at para. 33. Justice Major elaborates, “The Bill of Rights protects 
only rights that existed in 1960, prior to passage of the Bill of Rights. See, e.g., Miller v. The 
Queen, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 680, at pp. 703-4 (no absolute right to life existed prior to the Bill of 
Rights, so a death penalty statute was not inoperative); R. v. Burnshine, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 693, 
at p. 705 (a right to uniform sentencing across different regions of Canada did not exist prior 
to 1960, and was therefore not protected by the Bill of Rights).” (At para. 33.) 
39  Mullan, supra, note 9, at 15. 
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would have been entitled to no procedural guarantees prior to 1960, 
were found to be entitled to an oral hearing in 1985. 
The Court appeared to have a promising case to clarify the proce-
dural dimensions of the Bill of Rights, and in particular the section 2(e) 
fair hearing protection, in the Bell Canada case. As discussed below, 
however, the Court chose to avoid the key question whether the content 
of “fair hearing” and the common law duty of procedural fairness are 
coterminous or distinct. 
2. Bell Canada v. C.T.E.A. 
Bell Canada involved complex pay equity litigation which has 
dragged on for years, often ending up in Federal Court based on chal-
lenges to the impartiality and independence of the Canadian Human 
Rights Tribunal which is conducting the hearing.40 This appeal raised 
two such concerns: first, that the Tribunal lacked independence because 
the Canadian Human Rights Commission, a party of interest in the pro-
ceedings, has the power to issue binding guidelines interpreting the 
Canadian Human Rights Act41 in “classes of cases”; and second, that the 
Tribunal lacks independence because the Chair of the Tribunal has dis-
cretion over whether sitting members can continue to hear cases which 
will run on past the expiry of their terms. While the Act clearly author-
ized both powers, Bell argued that because the Tribunal is purely adju-
dicative — more a “human rights court” than an administrative tribunal 
— it should enjoy the constitutional protections of “adjudicative inde-
pendence,” and alternatively, that section 2(e) of the Canadian Bill of 
Rights, which guarantees a “fair hearing,” is a quasi-constitutional pro-
tection which renders inoperative statutory provisions inconsistent with 
the standards of independence and impartiality.  
The Tribunal rejected Bell’s position and directed that the hearings 
should proceed. The Federal Court, Trial Division, allowed Bell’s appli-
cation for judicial review, holding that even the narrowed guideline 
power of the Commission unduly fettered the Tribunal, and that the 
Chairperson’s discretionary power to extend appointments did not leave 
                                                                                                                                
40  See, for example, Bell Canada v. C.T.E.A. (sub nom Bell Canada v. Canadian Tele-
phone Employees Assn.), [1998] 3 F.C. 244, [1998] F.C.J. No. 313. 
41  R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6 [am. 1998, c. 9]. 
204  Supreme Court Law Review (2004), 25 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 
Tribunal members with a sufficient guarantee of tenure.42 The trial judge 
based her remedy, which was to quash the proceedings, on the fact that 
the institutional structure of the Tribunal was inconsistent with the pro-
tection afforded under section 2(e) of the Bill of Rights.43 The Federal 
Court of Appeal reversed that judgment (although, because it had re-
versed on the issue of whether the common law standard of independ-
ence was breached, the Court indicated that the scope of the procedural 
reach of section 2(e) of the Bill of Rights per se did not need to be ad-
dressed — the implication of this position is that section 2(e) of the Bill 
of Rights could be triggered only where a Court found the common law 
standards of procedural fairness were inconsistent with a statutory pro-
vision).44  
The Supreme Court unanimously upheld the judgment of the Court 
of Appeal. The Court reiterated in Bell Canada two principles of admin-
istrative independence. First, the Court unambiguously affirmed its 
position in Ocean Port that adjudicative tribunals do not enjoy any con-
stitutionally rooted protection of judicial independence or impartiality. 
Writing jointly for the Court, McLachlin C.J. and Bastarache J. also 
rejected the attempt by Bell Canada to delineate a category of tribunals, 
known as “quasi-judicial” or “purely adjudicative,” which would be 
subject to higher requirements of independence and impartiality.  
In light of their analysis of the Human Rights Tribunal, McLachlin 
C.J. and Bastarache J. concluded that a high degree of independence 
applied to the Tribunal, and that neither of the powers challenged in-
fringed that standard. In particular, they characterized the guideline 
making power as akin to the power of Cabinet or a Ministry to make 
Regulations. An administrative tribunal’s impartiality cannot be said to 
be compromised because it is bound to apply the “law” relevant to a 
particular setting. They concluded, “[t]he Act therefore evinces a legis-
lative intent, not simply to establish a Tribunal that functions by means 
of a quasi-judicial process, but also to limit the interpretive powers of 
the Tribunal in order to ensure that the legislation is interpreted in a 
non-discriminatory way.”45 The fact that the Commission’s guidelines 
                                                                                                                                
42  [2001] 2 F.C. 392, [2000] F.C.J. No. 1747 (T.D.). 
43  Id., at paras. 129-30. 
44  [2001] 3 F.C. 481, [2001] F.C.J. No. 776 (C.A.). 
45  Supra, note 3, at para. 26. 
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were subject to the Statutory Instruments Act46 and that the process for 
developing guidelines involved consultations analogous to the legisla-
tive process further distinguished them from mere administrative guide-
lines in the Court’s eyes.47 The Court also was not persuaded that the 
Chair’s power to extend the term of members past the expiry of their 
term adversely affected the independence or impartiality of the Tribunal, 
especially since a similar power in relation to provincial court judges 
was upheld as not inconsistent with judicial independence in R. v. 
Valente.48 
Because the common law standard of independence and impartiality 
was held not to be infringed, the Court saw no reason to embark on a 
discussion of section 2(e) of the Bill of Rights. This implies that the 
standards of independence and impartiality contained in section 2(e)’s 
“fair hearing” right are identical to the common law standards for im-
partiality and independence, or put differently, confirms that the Bill of 
Rights serves merely to “entrench” already existing common law rights 
rather than create new ones.49 Chief Justice McLachlin and Bastarache J. 
stopped short of explicitly endorsing this view, finding instead that since 
none of the parties suggested the standards differed, the issue did not 
arise. As indicated above, this approach left in doubt the distinctiveness, 
if any, of the procedural guarantees contained in the Bill of Rights.  
To take but one example, the Bill of Rights separately guarantees a 
“fair hearing” under section 2(e) and a “fair and public hearing by an 
independent and impartial tribunal” under 2(f), which is limited in scope 
to criminal adjudication. Generally, the Supreme Court has yet to rule 
on the precise scope of the independence and impartiality requirements 
contained in the Bill of Rights.50  
                                                                                                                                
46  R.S.C. 1985, c. S-22. 
47  Bell Canada, supra, note 3, at para. 37. 
48  [1985] 2 S.C.R. 673, [1985] S.C.J. No. 77. 
49  This is a point also underscored by Major J. in Authorson, supra, note 2, at para. 33, 
discussed above. 
50  In MacBain, the Federal Court of Appeal held inoperative a provision of the Human 
Rights Act which permitted the Commission to appoint specific members of the Tribunal’s 
hearing panel. While it predated the development of the doctrine of administrative independ-
ence and institutional bias, MacBain has been cited numerous times since although never 
expressly adopted by the Supreme Court. In Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Taylor, 
[1990] 3 S.C.R. 892, at 941-42, [1990] S.C.J. No. 129, which considered, inter alia, whether 
the Canadian Human Rights Commission was biased because of its multiple functions in the 
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Neither Authorson nor Bell Canada provided the necessary factual 
and legal matrix to examine the relationship between the procedural 
protections of the Bill of Rights and other procedural protections con-
tained at common law or under the Charter.  
In Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration),51 the 
Supreme Court synthesized its approach to the duty of fairness at com-
mon law, setting out five factors to be used in determining the appropri-
ate degree of fairness owed in specific contexts. In Suresh v. Canada 
(Minister of Citizenship & Immigration),52 the Supreme Court con-
firmed that the same methodology would be applied in determining the 
minimum procedural rights guaranteed under section 7 of the Charter.53 
Given that section 2(e) of the Bill of Rights blends common law and 
constitutional norms (“fair hearing” with “principles of fundamental 
justice”), one would expect a similar methodology to be employed in 
determining the scope of the procedural protections under the Bill of 
Rights. This issue did not squarely arise in either Authorson or Bell 
Canada, as neither case presented the Court with a scenario that met the 
threshold for the application of the procedural aspects of the Bill of 
Rights (in Authorson, this was because the legislative process was 
deemed not to be a “hearing,” while in Bell Canada, this was because 
the fact a tribunal was bound by “law” was deemed not to raise ques-
tions of fairness such as impartiality). Thus, key questions about the 
interpretation and application of the Bill of Rights remain largely unre-
solved. The Court will have an opportunity shortly to once again revisit 
the Bill of Rights. As discussed below, the time may well be ripe for the 
Court to clarify the intersection of the Bill of Rights and Canadian ad-
ministrative law.  
                                                                                                                                
human rights administrative process, the Court was asked to apply MacBain. They declined to 
do so since the circumstances of Taylor were distinguishable as the allegation of bias was 
only raised several years after the initial hearing.  
51  Supra, note 22. 
52  [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3, [2002] S.C.J. No. 3. 
53  While adopting the common law framework, the Court took pains to emphasize that 
a distinction remained between the common law and constitutional analysis of procedural 
fairness, stating, “The principles of fundamental justice of which s. 7 speaks, though not 
identical to the duty of fairness elucidated in Baker, are the same principles underlying that 
duty… At the end of the day, the common law is not constitutionalized; it is used to inform 
the constitutional principles that apply to this case.” Id., at paras. 113-14. 
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III.  THE BILL OF RIGHT’S FUTURE: AIR CANADA, DUE PROCESS, 
AND BALANCING RIGHTS 
The elusive case capable of putting the nature and scope of proce-
dural protections under the Bill of Rights squarely before the Court may 
well be Air Canada v. Canada. The issue in the appeal is a provision of 
the Competition Act which empowers the Commissioner of Competition 
to issue temporary orders without notice or hearing54 — in this case, an 
order against Air Canada in the context of an inquiry into alleged abuses 
— which remained in force for a period of 20 days and could be re-
newed for two further 30-day periods. When issuing these orders, which 
could have substantial economic impacts on affected parties, the Com-
missioner acted, in effect, as investigator, prosecutor, and judge. Like 
Authorson and Bell Canada, this case raised procedural concerns which 
flowed directly from a legislative scheme. Unlike those cases, however, 
the allegations of procedural unfairness do not relate to the legislative 
process. Like Ocean Port, this case involves a practice which, if it were 
not expressly authorized by statute, would appear at first glance to be 
contrary to the common law requirements of institutional impartiality 
and independence. 
The Quebec Court of Appeal declared the impugned provision of 
the Competition Act to be inoperative because it was inconsistent with 
the protection contained in section 2(e) of the Bill of Rights. The Quebec 
Court of Appeal’s decision in Air Canada was issued in January of 
2003, after the Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision in Authorson and the 
Federal Court of Appeal’s decision in Bell Canada (and its then-
companion decision of Northwest Territories v. P.S.A.C.).55 Citing those 
appellate decisions, along with the earlier Singh and MacBain cases, the 
Quebec Court of Appeal rejected the submission that section 2(e) of the 
Bill of Rights was “outdated” and asserted, 
[s]ince Drybones, and even more so since the adoption of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982, the courts have 
not hesitated to invoke the Canadian Bill of Rights to declare 
                                                                                                                                
54  Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34, s. 104.1. 
55  [2001] 3 F.C. 566, [2001] F.C.J. No. 791, 201 D.L.R. (4th) 128 (C.A.), leave to ap-
peal to S.C.C. granted by the Supreme Court of Canada, however discontinuance on August 
15, 2002, Court File No. 28737. 
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inoperative any contrary legislative provisions enacted by the 
Canadian Parliament.56 
Turning to the interpretation of the Bill of Rights, the Quebec Court 
of Appeal linked the quasi-constitutional nature of the Bill of Rights 
with the Supreme Court’s approach to Parliamentary supremacy in 
Ocean Port. Justice of Appeal Rochon stated: 
It is true that Parliament may expressly amend the principles of 
procedural fairness. But, any such amendments must comply with the 
Constitution and quasi-constitutional instruments. Thus, to the extent 
that Parliament amends these principles and that the Act is not 
attacked constitutionally, Parliament remains sovereign within its 
field. [footnote 21] 
[footnote 21] Ocean Port Hotel Ltd. v. British Columbia (General 
Manager, Liquor Control and Licensing Branch), [2001] 2 S.C.R. 
781, [2001] S.C.J. No. 17, 2001 SCC 52, 204 D.L.R. (4th) 33, 
paras. 20-22, discussing the principle of natural justice, 
independence and fairness of administrative decision-makers.57  
Therefore, where section 2(e) applies, it would appear, at a mini-
mum, to constitutionally entrench the protections afforded by the com-
mon law duty of fairness. As in the case of the Supreme Court’s 
approach to the methodology of section 7 of the Charter, the Quebec 
Court of Appeal turns to the common law framework for ascertaining 
the appropriate degree of fairness owed in a particular context (as last 
articulated by the Supreme Court in Baker) as a means of determining 
the appropriate degree of fairness owed under section 2(e) of the Bill of 
Rights. The Quebec Court of Appeal’s approach, along with the Su-
preme Court’s approach in Suresh, reflects what broadly may be con-
strued as a trend toward the “unity of public law,” under which Charter, 
international, quasi-constitutional, and administrative duties are viewed 
as aligned and interrelated.58  
Drawing on constitutional, quasi-constitutional, and common law 
case law, the Quebec Court of Appeal concluded that the impugned 
                                                                                                                                
56  Air Canada, supra, note 4, at para. 43. 
57  Id., at para. 56. 
58  See D. Dyzenhaus (ed.), The Unity of Public Law (London: Hart, 2004). 
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provision of the Competition Act violated the rules of natural justice 
which guarantee institutional impartiality (as entrenched under section 
2(e) of the Bill of Rights). Further, drawing on sources from the protec-
tion of aboriginal rights to the Charter, the Court also accepted that the 
rights protected in the Bill of Rights, including section 2(e), should be 
subject to some limiting mechanism by which the government can es-
tablish legitimate infringements. The circumstances of Air Canada, 
however, failed to meet the modified Oakes test which the Quebec 
Court of Appeal proposed and applied. The Court bluntly held that 
“[T]hese violations of rights guaranteed by section 2(e) of the Canadian 
Bill of Rights are neither reasonable nor justified.”59 Thus, unlike Au-
thorson and Bell Canada, Air Canada will place the nature and scope of 
the procedural protections under section 2(e) of the Bill of Rights to 
legislation curtailing procedural fairness (and the link between this 
quasi-constitutional protection and the scheme of Parliamentary su-
premacy affirmed in Ocean Port) squarely before the Supreme Court 
when the appeal in that case is decided this coming term. If the Quebec 
Court of Appeal’s approach to section 2(e) is validated, the quasi-
revival of the Bill of Rights, which the decisions in Authorson and Bell 
Canada have to some extent deflated, will no doubt gain new momen-
tum. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
One of the enduring issues in the Bill of Rights jurisprudence is how 
the protections it contains were intended to evolve and how they were 
intended to be limited. While a quasi-constitutional instrument may not 
be a living tree, neither should it be permitted to ossify into a petrified 
forest. In Canada (Attorney General) v. Central Cartage Co.,60 the Fed-
eral Court of Appeal considered a challenge to a provision of the Can-
ada Evidence Act61 providing for certain Crown privileges. Justice of 
Appeal Iacobucci (as he then was) stated: 
                                                                                                                                
59  Supra, note 4, at para. 107. 
60  (1990), 71 D.L.R. (4th) 253, [1990] F.C.J. No. 407 (C.A.). 
61  R.S.C. 1970, c. E-10 [now R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5]. 
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The fair hearing guaranteed in s. 2(e) of the Bill of Rights is not a 
frozen concept that remains static. A court in interpreting the concept, 
should be mindful of its origin and evolution and of the specific 
context in which it is being raised. In other words, the guarantee of a 
fair hearing in s. 2(e) should be given a meaning that recognizes not 
only the interpretation and evolution of the term over time but also the 
particular circumstances involved. [footnote 9] 
[footnote 9] In this respect, I agree with the analysis of Professor 
Peter Hogg when he concludes that, although the Canadian Bill of 
Rights does not contain a limitation clause comparable to section 
one of the Charter, courts have not interpreted the guarantees of 
the Bill of Rights as absolute. See Hogg, “A Comparison of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms with the Canadian Bill 
of Rights”, in Beaudoin and Ratushny, Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms, 2nd ed. (1989), p. 7.62 
In this sense, I view what I would characterize the “quasi-revival” of 
the Bill of Rights to be a positive development. I wish to conclude, how-
ever, with several caveats to that assessment.  
First, because at least some of the Bill of Rights protections extend 
to property rights, there is a concern that the Bill of Rights will be used 
by corporate interests to resist efforts at legitimate regulation by the 
state. Here, the three cases discussed in this analysis present something 
of an irony. The only case among these invoking the property rights 
“due process” protection, Authorson, involved a group of disabled vet-
erans fending off an expropriation by the state. This kind of normative 
claim regarding the redress of unjust state action against vulnerable 
parties suggests fears regarding corporate interests brandishing the Bill 
of Rights against progressive state intervention may be overstated. How-
ever, Bell Canada and Air Canada, which raised only the “fair hearing” 
protections under section 2(e), arose out of claims by large corporations 
seeking to roll back state intervention aimed at countering human rights 
violations and competition abuses, respectively. As with the Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms, perhaps it is not surprising that both vulnerable 
groups and powerful interests benefit when legal instruments offering 
procedural guarantees are entrenched. 
                                                                                                                                
62  Canada (Attorney General) v. Central Cartage Co., supra, note 60, at 270. 
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Second, there are several questions that arise from the Quebec Court 
of Appeal’s use of the Baker common law framework to assess the 
degree of fairness owed under section 2(e) of the Bill of Rights in the Air 
Canada case.63 The point of that framework in Baker, and other com-
mon law cases, is said to be the search for the degree of fairness in-
tended by the legislature in the statute empowering the decision-making. 
In other words, the Court purports in the common law cases to be filling 
in the blanks left by vague or ambiguous statutory provisions which call 
for a “hearing” or for a matter “to be determined.” This strikes me as a 
strange foundation on which to build protections intended to curtail the 
ability of statutes themselves to impose procedures that are contrary to 
the “principles of fundamental justice” or “due process.” While a con-
textual analysis is no doubt appropriate, and while a variable spectrum 
of fairness obligations will invariably result from this analysis, some 
discussion of the different aims and origins of the constitutional and 
quasi-constitutional standards of fairness from those at common law 
would seem necessary.64 
Third and finally, the Bill of Rights uniquely (and one must pre-
sume, intentionally) uses two different formulations to connote proce-
dural guarantees — one is the reference to “due process” under section 
1(a) and the other is the reference to “fair hearing in accordance with the 
principles of fundamental justice” under section 2(e). When one consid-
ers the various appellate decisions in Authorson and Bell Canada, it 
would appear that section 2(e) does little more than entrench the exist-
ing common law jurisprudence on procedural fairness (and may not 
even do this if Major J.’s assertion that the Bill of Rights extends only to 
rights which existed in 1960). As for “due process,” beyond some gen-
eral assertions regarding the procedural obligation of “notice and some 
opportunity to contest a governmental deprivation,”65 we are left with 
                                                                                                                                
63  Supra, note 4, at para. 82. A similar approach was taken to the scope of disclosure 
obligations pursuant to section 2(e) of the Bill of Rights by the Competition Tribunal in 
Canada (Commissioner of Competition) v. Canada Pipe Co. (2003), 28 C.P.R. (4th) 335 
(Competition Tribunal). 
64  The same concern, it should be added, arises in the case of the adoption of the Baker 
framework under the s. 7 procedural rights analysis in Suresh, supra, note 52, notwithstand-
ing the Court’s assertion, emphasized above, that by adopting the common law framework, it 
is not merely “constitutionalizing” the common law procedural guarantee.  
65  Authorson, supra, note 2, at para. 42. 
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little clarity on its nature and scope, and a series of questions. Given that 
“due process” and “fairness” are now used interchangeably in adminis-
trative law circles (just like the “duty of fairness” and the “rules of natu-
ral justice”), does it make sense to impose some artificially derived 
distinctness on their definition under the Bill of Rights simply because 
they may have been understood differently in 1960?66 On the other 
hand, can courts interpreting a statute, even a quasi-constitutional one, 
ignore the plain meaning of the legislative intent to use different termi-
nology in these two distinct settings? Finally, how should courts inter-
preting the Bill of Rights use the Charter in its analysis, which conflates 
some of the language from section 1 of the Bill of Rights (life, liberty, 
and security of the person) with language from section 2(e) (principles 
of fundamental justice) in order to establish the procedural protections 
under section 7 of the Charter?  
These caveats are intended not to sound a note of caution regarding 
the renewed interest in the Bill of Rights, but rather to anticipate the 
more rigorous examinations which will accompany Bill of Rights’ juris-
prudence if this revival continues. It would be a strange and perhaps 
happy irony if the orphan of Canada’s constitutional order were to be-
come a principal vehicle to elaborate and explore the most intriguing 
quandaries of administrative law. This proves the adage that if you leave 
something in the back of the closet long enough, it is bound to come 
back in fashion eventually. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                
66  There has been at least some indication that Courts might approach “due process” as 
a broader procedural guarantee, encompassing “a total process” including a reasonableness 
requirement. See Smith, Kline & French Laboratories Ltd. v. Canada (Attorney General), 
supra, note 16. 
